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THE AUDITOR AS STANDARD-SETTER – 







This paper provides detailed examples in a US GAAP context of what happens when 
promulgated rules reach preparers and auditors.  We show that auditors are creating their own 
detailed “sub-rules” which they then impose on their clients.  We suggest that such activities 
may be  
•  Outside any “due process”, and therefore failing to fulfill the requirements of 
institutional legitimacy 
•  Imposing legalistic form over economic substance 
•  Incompatible with supposedly higher order requirements in the US GAAP hierarchy 
•  Inconsistent with the FASB recognition that the responsibility for selecting 
appropriate accounting policies rests with preparers 
•  Despite all the above, supported by the FASB.   
 
We generalize the implications of these arguments in the international harmonization context 
and suggest that, whilst auditor and preparer application and interpretation of promulgated 
GAAP at the enterprise level are vital if a fair presentation of the “underlying economics” is 
to be given, imposed auditor rules may be incompatible with this outcome.  The apparent 
FASB support for, or at least acquiescence in, such rules is problematic.  We suggest reasons 
why the FASB/SEC approach might well be overturned if a case is ever brought before the 
US courts. 
 
The examples of required legalistic minutiae which we discuss are incompatible with the 
requirements and the philosophy of International Accounting Standards, and obvious 


















































Cette étude fournit des exemples détaillés dans le cadre du GAAP américain de l’arrivée au 
niveau des préparateurs et des réviseurs de nouveaux réglements promulgués. Nous 
montrons que les réviseurs créent leur propre ‘sous-réglement’ détaillé qu’ils imposent a leurs 
clients par la suite. Nous suggérons que de telles activitées pourraient être : 
•  Hors de tout jugement « en bonne et due forme » et donc ne répondant pas aux 
exigences de la légitimité institutionnelle 
•  Imposant la forme légaliste sur le contenu économique 
•  Incompatible avec ce qui sont sensés être les exigences supérieures dans la 
hiérarchie du GAAP américain 
•  Contradictoire avec la reconnaisance du FASB que la sélection des politiques 
convenables de comptabilité reste la responsabilité des préparateurs. 
•  Soutenues par le FASB en dépit de la liste dressée ci-dessus,  
Nous généralisons les implications de ces déviances dans le contexte de l’harmonisation 
internationale puis nous suggérons que les réglements imposés par les auditeurs sont 
incompatibles avec une présentation juste des «  économies implicites  », bien que 
l’application et l’interprétation du GAAP promulguées au niveau de l’entreprise par le réviseur 
et le préprateur soient essentiels. Le soutien apparent , ou du moins l’acceptation, du FASB 
pour de tels réglements est problématique. Nous proposons ici des raisons pour lesquelles 
l’approche du FASB/SEC pourrait être condamnée si une plainte était déposée devant un 
tribunal américain. 
Les exemples de minutiae légaliste nécessaire que nous examinons sont incompatibles avec 
les exigences et la philosophie des Normes de Comptabilité Internationales, ce qui provoque 


















































1)  Introduction 
 
The catalyst for writing this paper was the availability to the authors of some direct 
and detailed evidence concerning the practical application of the rules of US GAAP.  
Cooper and Robson (2006), in their third section, review the state of the research 
literature on accounting regulation, and make a number of proposals towards a 
research agenda.  An important element in their suggestions concerns what happens 
after the formally promulgated GAAP has been created (pp427-8): 
 
(M)anager and auditors have a great deal of discretion as to 
how rules are enacted… (T)hese observations suggest the 
importance of studying the interpretation and implementation 
of rules (emphasis added). 
 
The detailed practical situations which we report in section 3 may be regarded as a 
rare insight into what may happen when promulgated GAAP reaches the real world. 
 
We provide evidence that auditors are creating micro-rules as their own interpretation 
of officially issued regulations and then imposing them on their clients.  We refer to 
this phenomenon as the creation of “auditor GAAP”.  We discuss reasons why 
auditors may rationally wish to do this, but argue that it raises major practical, 
conceptual, and even legal difficulties and concerns. 
 
We embed our detailed material in the context of some of the controversial issues 
concerning reporting regulations, which enables us to suggest that the practical 
creation of de facto regulation by auditors takes place under both private and public 
sector regulators.  Some parts of the world, often those countries with a common law 
system, favour a private sector body, with some form of State oversight, as the key 
accounting regulator.  Other countries, often those with a Roman (civil) law system, 
favour public sector bodies but have over the last decade increasingly introduced 
private sector bodies that issue rules that complement the regulations codified by 
public sector bodies.   At present the International Accounting Standards Board 









































0an endorsement process, into the European Union (EU), this latter body being largely 
civil law based with a strong tradition of direct public sector (and/or courts) 
involvement.   
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a more 
general discussion on the legitimacy of financial reporting regulations issued by 
private standard setting bodies from a theoretical perspective. This is followed by 
some detailed examples from US GAAP demonstrating de facto regulations by 
auditors. In section 4 the practical findings are assessed in the light of the theoretical 
considerations presented in section 2 and implications in a European and global 
context are discussed. Conclusions and suggestions for further research are provided 





2)  Legitimacy of financial reporting regulations issued by private institutions – 
theoretical considerations 
 
As outlined in section 1 above, there are two sources of financial reporting regulation 
– state (public) and non-state (private).  In both systems, however, the responsibility 
of ensuring the existence of an effective regulatory system lies completely with the 
state.  A key issue of both theoretical and practical importance concerns the 
legitimacy of non-state (private) financial reporting regulation.  With the advent of 
cross-national regulations this has become a very topical concern both at the European 
and at the global level.
4  
 
If regulation is indeed to be private sector based, the need for genuine institutional 
legitimacy cannot be ignored. Accounting regulations have economic consequences 
by imposing costs on some while benefiting others. Conflicts arise because affected 
parties have incompatible preferences for accounting rules (Hussein and Ketz, 1980). 
Standard-setting bodies attempt to regulate these conflicts by issuing accounting 
regulations (Hussein and Ketz, 1980). However, due to varying preferences it is 
                                                 
4   Two recent papers, Wüstemann and Kierzek (2007) and Chiapello and Medjad (2007) provide 
evidence of very real anxieties, as also does the Radwan Report presented to the European Parliament 
(Radwan, 2008).  We do not comment here on the (in)validity of the concerns expressed, but they are 









































0generally impossible to select accounting standards that achieve consent of all 
affected parties (Demski, 1973). Accordingly, rule-making requires ‘political’ choices 
making standard-setting a political process (Hussein and Ketz, 1980). Gerboth (1973: 
481) therefore concludes “In a society committed to democratic legitimisation of 
authority, only politically responsive institutions have the right to command others to 
obey their rules.” Accordingly, a standard-setting body needs to possess legitimacy 
meaning its standard-setting authority and its standard-setting process itself are 
accepted by its constituencies. Johnson and Solomons (1984) provided an in depth 
analysis of institutional legitimacy applied to the FASB.  They utilise “individualistic 
constitutional calculus”, which is “based on the premise that a process or institution is 
legitimate if it continues to be acceptable to its constituency in spite of the challenges 
posed to its credibility by the inevitable crises that surround the exercise of such 
authority” (p167).  Thus the viability of a private sector regulator (such as the FASB) 
“depends on its ability to sustain itself against criticism of both its rule-making 
procedures and the rules it promulgates” (p171). 
 
Johnson and Solomons suggest three conditions for “regulatory defensibility”     
(pp172-4), as follows: 
 
CONDITION 1 (Sufficient Authority):  An accounting 
standard-setting process possesses sufficient authority if it has 
both a clear mandate of authority … and competence to carry 
out the assigned function. 
 
CONDITION 2 (Substantive Due Process):  An accounting 
standard-setting process meets the substantive due process 
criterion if it adequately justifies each exercise of its authority 
and provides an adequate rationale for each ruling. 
 
CONDITION 3 (Procedural Due Process):  An accounting 
standard-setting process meets the procedural due process 
criterion if it permits all interested parties a reasonable and 
timely opportunity to be heard and provides a reasonable 
opportunity to influence the rule-making process. 
 
These conditions are held to be both necessary and sufficient.
5  
                                                 
5   Applying them (in the context of the time), Johnson and Solomons (1984: 179) conclude that: 
“there is support for the assertion that the FASB possesses sufficient institutional legitimacy to 










































Condition 1 ensures that a standard-setting process enjoys an adequate level of 
authority necessary to carry out its intended regulatory function. This requires not 
only a well defined and properly limited mandate but also institutional competence 
assuming the body in charge has an adequate level of expertise and independence 
(Johnson and Solomons, 1984).  
 
The second condition (substantive due process) is necessary to ensure the standard-
setter’s regulatory defensibility. It requires the decision-making body to be objective 
and unbiased and to act “…as a fiduciary in arbitrating disputes that may arise 
between the various interested parties, not as an agent of any one party or a group” 
(Johnson and Solomons, 1984). Acting as a fiduciary on the behalf of its constituency 
requires a standard-setting body to be firstly able to justify each exercise of its rule-
making authority, and secondly to provide an objective (rather than arbitrary or 
biased) rationale for each rule promulgated.  Anticipating and considering alternative 
points of view helps a rule-making body to defend itself against political exploitation 
by dissatisfied parties and reproaches that its rulings are capricious and biased 
(Johnson and Solomons, 1984). 
 
The third condition, procedural due process, is based on the premise that 
economically affected parties should have the possibility to influence the nature and 
direction of rule-making. Therefore, the procedural due process condition requires 
that all interested parties be informed of rule making issues before a standard is issued 
and are given a reasonable opportunity to provide input into the standard-setting 
process (Johnson and Solomons, 1984) 
 
An important issue related to the regulatory process (resulting from conditions 2 and 3 
above) is the role and (un?)desirability of lobbying.  This touches not only the issue 
that a rule-making body may be dominated by a particular party and its standards 
therefore biased towards the needs of a specific interest group.
6 It also links into the 
broader issue, which in a sense is where Johnson and Solomons started, of legitimacy 
                                                 
6   This has for example been intensively discussed for the FASB, see e.g. Johnson and Messier, 
1982; Hussein and Ketz, 1980.  Hussein and Ketz (1991: 66) make the link explicit:  “FASB due 
process provides the opportunity to lobby FASB and others to accept one’s position” (emphasis added).  









































0and democratic control of the regulatory process.  Schmidt (2002: 181), perhaps faces 
in both directions on the control implications.  He states as follows: 
 
A significant aspect in the US is the threat that the FASB’s 
rules could be rejected by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).  Leaving the final authoritative support for 
standards to a public or governmental authority can indeed 
serve as a considerable safeguard against special interest 
groups, provided, of course, that this authority clearly protects 
the needs of all affected individuals and is not also susceptible 
to such political influence. 
 
But he then adds a footnote suggesting that “the SEC has to be judged critically in this 
regard” (i.e. that the SEC has indeed demonstrated an excessive susceptibility to 
political influence).  There is ample evidence to support such criticism (see, for 
example, Zeff 1997, Sunder 2002: 147), but the problem surely applies just as 
strongly to the European Union (see the endorsement problems of IAS 39, e.g. in 
Alexander (2006: 70/71 with the famous letter from President Chirac as an 
appendix)).  Cooper and Robson (2006: 428) on the other hand raise the suggestion 
that “non-state regulatory organizations could undermine public accountability (at 
least through legislative authorities)”.   
 
In the last analysis a large multinational operating in many countries will have a 
detailed internal manual defining very precisely the accounting policies to be 
followed, and the returns to be filed at head office, by each branch or subsidiary.  
Such manuals in practice are often as detailed as providing posting and account 
instructions. In this sense the issue is not “do we have detailed rules?” but “who 
writes the detailed rules?”  Schipper (2005 :122) seems to believe that regulators will 
be looked to in this regard. 
If the IASB declines to provide detailed implementation 
guidance for IFRS, I predict that preparers and auditors will 
turn elsewhere, perhaps to US GAAP or perhaps to jurisdiction-
specific European GAAP, for that guidance. 
 











































0We now proceed to give some detailed examples in support of this suggestion in 
section 3, leading to a discussion of implications in section 4.  It should be noted that 
it is the supposedly heavily rule-based US GAAP in which the gaps are found here, 
not the more principles-based IFRSs. 
 
 
3)  Auditor GAAP creation 
 
 
We now document and discuss two recent cases of auditor influence on US GAAP.   
 
3.1  Auditor influence case 1 
The first example involves the application of ‘cash and cash equivalents’ as defined in 
SFAS 95.   According to SFAS 95, cash equivalents are 
short-term, highly liquid investments that are … readily 
convertible to known amounts of cash [and are] so near their 
maturity that they present insignificant risk of changes in value 
because of changes in interest rates, … generally only 
investments with original maturities [to the entity holding the 
investment] of three months or less qualify under that 
definition.  
 
Two very common instruments used in the US for investing cash on a short-term basis 
are Auction Rate Securities (ARSs) and Variable Return Demand Notes (VRDNs).   
 
ARSs are securities with a stated or contractual maturity generally of some 20 or 30 
years.  After their initial issuance, the interest rate on the securities is reset at periodic 
intervals, which intervals are established at the time of the initial issue.  These 
intervals are short, typical examples being 7, 28 or 35 days.  At each reset time, the 
existing holders of ARSs have three alternatives, namely to continue their existing 
holding and accept the new interest rate (which is set by a market bidding process), to 
join in the bidding process by proposing a new rate, necessarily liquidating the 
securities if their rate bid is not accepted, or, thirdly, to sell.  If an auction fails, e.g. 
because sell orders are greater than buy orders, then an existing holder has to retain 
his holding until the next auction date.  Investors cannot force issuers to redeem ARSs 
if an auction fails.  However, unless there is a credit crisis by the issuer, or possibly 











































Despite the long-term maturities, from an investor’s 
perspective, ARSs are priced and subsequently trade as short-
term investments because of the interest rate reset feature   
 
(PWC, 2005, para 2; 2006 para 5). 
 
VRDNs are broadly similar in their effect.  They again have a stated or contractual 
maturity term of, typically, 20 to 30 years.  But after the initial issue, a VRDN’s 
interest rate periodically resets, at intervals predetermined at the issue date, eg daily, 
weekly, monthly etc. by a predetermined mechanism.  Generally, the VRDN 
agreement allows the investor to tender the note for repurchase at the same intervals 
as for the interest rate resets, i.e. there is a built-in put facility in the contract (unlike 
with ARSs). Only a minority of VRDNS can be tendered to the issuer of the VRDN,  
while most VRDNs can only be tendered to an agent, i.e. an entity other than the 
issuer. 
 
It can be seen that ARSs and VRDNs share two key characteristics.  These are firstly 
that the instrument as issued has a long maturity date, and secondly that they are de 
facto operated regularly and reliably as short-term highly liquid investments.  The 
question is; are they cash equivalents under US GAAP?  For many years, US 
companies classified both as cash equivalents, due to the possibility to exit the 
instruments whenever required within a period well under three months, with the full 
agreement of auditors and regulators.  SAP provides one example of this. 
 
Even at this stage, it is clear that a significant issue is the relative importance of the 
technical legal position on the one hand versus the practicalities of the market place 
on the other.  The de jure (form) position is that an ARS auction could fail, potentially 
leading to relevance of the nominal term of the security, which is longer than three 
months.  The de facto (substance) position is that there is a reasonable and reliable 
expectation of the availability of non-loss-making liquidation within significantly less 
than three months.  The general principle of substance over form in US GAAP
7 
therefore supports the longstanding acceptance of cash equivalence.   
                                                 
7 See for example AICPA (2001): “Generally accepted accounting principles recognise the importance 
of reporting transactions and events in accordance with their substance.  The auditor should consider 










































In February 2005 PWC issued guidance (PWC, 2005) that ARSs should not be treated 
as cash equivalents, following the de jure argument above.  Under the subheading 
“PWC Observation”, the document states as follows. 
 
To properly classify its auction rate securities, an investor must determine, at 
the time of purchase, when the securities will mature.  Given that most auction 
rate securities have maturities that span many years, such securities will 
qualify as cash equivalents only if they are acquired three months prior to 
maturity. 
 
We understand that the other three major accounting firms all presently hold a 
similar view, although some have only recently come to their current position.  
Through discussions with these other firms, we also understand that this view 
is shared by the staff at the FASB, Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 
 
This last comment is somewhat misleading.  While there is no evidence of the views 
of the FASB staff, the minutes of an FASB meeting in 2005 (FASB, 2005) show that 
the FASB discussed whether it should provide authoritative guidance on whether 
ARSs (and VRDNs) are cash equivalents.  They also show that different FASB board 
members had different opinions, and the FASB decided not to work on the issue. The 
discussions with the SEC that PWC mentions showed obvious effect. In March 2005 
the SEC staff added to its website guidance in line with the PWC position 
(http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/acctdis030405.htm). It remains open whether 
the insight into the views of the SEC staff and the PCAOB result from comments that 
clients of the major accounting firms have received from the SEC as part of the SEC’s 
regular review procedures, or that the accounting firms themselves have received 
from the PCAOB as part of PCAOB reviews of the firms’ working papers. 
 
At the time, VRDNs were said to be unaffected by the new arguments, as they 
included an unavoidable put option, giving an obligation of the issuer or its agent to 
buy, thus ensuring that the investor can liquidate.  However a year later PWC issued 
new guidance (PWC, 2006) which said that most VRDNs should not be classified as 
cash equivalents. 
 
The argument, applicable now to both ARSs and VRDNs, is (PWC, 2006 para 10) 










































Either (1) the security’s maturity date must generally be no later than three 
months after the date of purchase, or (2) at all times throughout its term, the 
security must be allowed to be put to the issuer within three months…. 
 
The key point is the “to the issuer”.  Whilst the typical VRDN contract guarantees 
liquidity to the investor, it does not guarantee it from the issuer.  It follows that the 
letter of the SFAS 95 cash equivalent definition is not generally satisfied.  A PWC 
observation adds: 
 
The apparent financial strength of the financial institution providing a line of 
credit or any other credit-enhancer, coupled with well-defined and prompt 
contractual access to such credit, is not a factor suggesting cash equivalency.  
Ultimate access to the issuer is required.  The probability that the issuer will 
be required to redeem the security is not relevant; what is relevant is whether 
the issuer stands ready to redeem within three months if called upon. 
 
The 2006 PWC document, like the 2005 one, claims support and agreement from “the 
other three major accounting firms and the SEC staff”, although the SEC staff has 
until today not added the VRDNs to the guidance on ARS quoted above – despite 
several updates of the document (see   
http://www.sec.gov/divisons/corpfin/cfacctdisclosureissues.pdf).   This argument is of 
course a classic and pure example of form over substance, in direct opposition to the 
conceptual principle that the economic substance of a transaction or situation needs to 
be presented, whatever the legal form might be. The principle of substance over form 
is a paramount concept under US GAAP. Though it is not explicitly stated as a 
qualitative characteristic of financial information, it is inherent in the qualitative 
characteristic of representation faithfulness. 
 
The quality of reliability and, in particular, of representational faithfulness leaves no 
room for accounting representations that subordinate substance to form. (FASB 1980, 
SFAC 2, Appendix B, para. 160).  
 
The Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council therefore concludes: 
 
to be representationally faithful, accounting measures or descriptions must 
reflect economic phenomena—economic resources and obligations and the 
transactions that change them—and not simply accounting notions.     










































0The substance over form issue has been thrown into greater prominence in the US 
context by the Enron events.  Baker and Hayes (2004) make a number of interesting 
comments.  They suggest that historically, substance over form has been less 
dominant under US GAAP than under IFRS (pp769-70), and that an increase in 
emphasis on substance would certainly be beneficial, though not a simple panacea, in 
the US.  Most tellingly from the viewpoint of our arguments in this paper, they make 
an explicit allegation against the FASB (p783): 
 
  In effect, the FASB has allowed SPEs to be created knowing that they 
represent form over substance (emphasis added). 
 
Exactly the same thing seems to be happening here, with the FASB working by proxi 
through the Big Four.  Certainly the effect of the pronouncements we describe is that 
many companies have been forced, by their auditors, to change their accounting 
policies, with retrospective restatement if material, twice in two years. A full text 
search of the term “reclassification of auction rate securities” in the SEC’s database of 
companies’ annual reports on Form 10K filings (including amended filings (10-K/A)) 
reveals a list of nearly 50 companies. Some of these companies even reported a 
weakness in their internal controls over financial reporting in connection with the 
restatement/reclassification. 
 
An illustration of preparer reaction is given by a press release of 19 July 2006 put out 
by the Association of Financial Professionals (2006).
8  
 
Quoting the President and CEO of the AFP, the press release states as follows: 
 
As FAS-95 is currently written, it is not responsive to today’s markets and 
fails to recognise today’s investment infrastructure.  Twice in the past two 
years companies were forced to abandon accepted practices when the ‘Big 
Four’ firms made immediate, unilateral and retroactive changes applying 
                                                 
8    The AFP is a global organization that serves more than 14.000 corporate treasury and financial 
management professionals. It provides professional certification, education, training and career 
development, research, promulgation of industry standards, financial tools and publication, and 
representation to legislators and regulators. The mission of AFP’s public policy program is to bring the 
profession’s point of view to the attention of legislators and regulators. In this function the AFP is also 
concerned with accounting issues. Via press releases and comment letters the AFP factors the concerns 
of its members into public discussion and to the attention of the FASB (Association for Financial 










































0narrow logic to the cash definition.  The standards are no longer being applied 
universally and CFOs and corporate treasurers are now questioning if money 
market accounts can still be considered a cash equivalent or whether these 
accounts will be the next target.  The time has come for FASB to update FAS-
95 to assist practitioners in better understanding the definition of cash 
equivalents. 
 
The last sentence of this quotation is a not very subtly worded request for FASB to 
overrule the accounting firms.
9  The first sentence, assuming it is correct, would be a 
proper justification for so doing. 
 
It is clear that two types of issue arise from the situation we describe.  The first 
concerns the validity of the arguments themselves.  This reduces itself in essence to 
consideration of substance over form, principles versus rules, and the extent to which 
financial statements and reports are, or are not, supposed to reflect the “underlying 
economic reality” (Levitt, 2003, emphasis added).  We discuss these issues and their 
implications in section 4. 
 
The second issue concerns the regulatory, governance and due process aspects.  It is 
this latter consideration which is a fundamental concern of this paper.  Before 
discussing this in detail, we present our second example of auditor influence on US 
GAAP.  
 
3.2  Auditor influence case 2 
 
  This example concerns Software Revenue Recognition, specified in SOP 97-2 as 
amended by SOP 98-9. 
 
The topic of revenue recognition in the software industry belongs to the areas for 
which US GAAP provides a high level of authoritative guidance. Since the issuance 
of the AICPA’s Statement of Position 97-2 “Software Revenue Recognition” (SOP 
97-2), which includes 145 paragraphs, three appendices and a glossary, a substantial 
amount of further guidance has been issued, including nearly 40 Technical Practice 
                                                 









































0Aids (TPAs) issued by the AICPA, several EITF issues
10 and the SEC’s Staff 
Accounting Bulleting 104 (SAB 104). Furthermore SOP 97-2 makes reference to 
other authoritative guidance.
11 Despite this broad coverage all four Big Four have 
issued books on software revenue recognition. (KPMG, 2007; Ernst & Young, 2007a;  
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005, Deloitte & Touche 2006) While all four books state 
their main purpose to be helping the understanding and application of the existing 
guidance, all four books go beyond this purpose by adding their interpretations of 
issues or details of issues which are not specifically covered by the authoritative 
guidance.
12 By that the audit firms add additional guidance to the existing 
authoritative guidance. While this guidance is not authoritative by nature it can be 
assumed and experienced in practice that the audit firms expect their clients to follow 
this additional guidance. 
In the following we provide an illustration to outline how far this additional guidance 
goes, how the guidance differs from audit firm to audit firm and how it adds a layer of 
detail which makes the portfolio software revenue recognition guidance in its entirety 
even more rule-based than already provided by the authoritative guidance alone. 
Illustration: 
It is common practice in the software industry to sell to customers post contract 
support services (PCS), under which the software vendor provides maintenance 
services (telephone support etc.) and/or unspecified upgrades and enhancements for 
software previously sold to the respective customers. If such PCS is sold together with 
the respective software, a multi element arrangement exists and the question arises 
how the total fee from the arrangement is to be allocated to the software and the 
maintenance (and possibly other services sold with the software and the PCS). For 
this allocation purpose SOP 97-2 introduced the concept of vendor-specific objective 
                                                 
10   There are EITFs that specifically deal with the scope of SOP 97-2 (EITF 00-03 “Application 
of AICPA Statement of Position 97-2 to Arrangements That Include the Right to Use Software Stored 
on Another Entity’s Hardware”; EITF 03-5 “Applicability of AICPA Statement of Position 97-2 to 
Non-Software Deliverables in an Arrangement Containing More-Than-Incidental Software”. Other 
EITFs are not specific to the software industry but nevertheless impact software revenue recognition 
(e.g. EITF 01-9 “Accounting for Consideration Given by a Vendor to a Customer (Including a Reseller 
of the Vendor’s Products”) 
11   E.g. SFAS 48 “Revenue Recognition When Right of Return Exists”; SOP 81-1 “Accounting 
for Performance of Construction-Type and Certain Production-Type Contracts” 
12   The extent of providing additional guidance is less profound in the PWC book than in the 









































0evidence of fair value (VSOE) as the authors of SOP 97-2 believed that product 
offerings by different software vendors are too different to allow the use of a non-
vendor specific fair value concept.
13 Paragraph 10 of SOP 97-2 provides that  
If an arrangement includes multiple elements, the fee should be 
allocated to the various elements based on vendor-specific 
objective evidence of fair value.  
Paragraph 10 also provides that VSOE of an element is usually: 
the price charged when the same element is sold separately. 
Paragraph 57 of SOP 97-2 provides specific guidance for PCS which is very similar to 
the general guidance in paragraph 10:  
If a multiple-element software arrangement includes explicit or 
implicit rights to PCS, the total fees from the arrangement 
should be allocated among the elements based on vendor-
specific objective evidence of fair value, in conformity with 
paragraph 10. The fair value of the PCS should be determined 
by reference to the price the customer will be required to pay 
when it is sold separately (that is, the renewal rate).
14  
While paragraph 58 of SOP 97-2 provides guidance on how to account for PCS if 
sufficient VSOE does not exist for PCS, neither SOP97-2 nor the related TPAs and 
EITFs provide guidance on how to determine whether sufficient VSOE exists or not. 
While the PWC book and the Deloitte & Touche book are mostly silent on the issue, 
both the E&Y book and the KPMG book fill this gap by providing detailed guidance 
on the process to determine whether VSOE exists. Both books identify and describe in 
detail two approaches for VSOE determination:  
                                                 
13   “AcSEC considered allowing the use of surrogate prices such as competitor prices for similar 
products or industry averages to determine fair value. However, AcSEC believes that inherent 
differences exist between elements offered by different vendors. These inherent differences led AcSEC 
to conclude that only vendor-specific evidence of fair value can be considered sufficiently objective to 
allow the allocation of the revenue to the various elements of the arrangement.” (SOP 97-2.100) 
14   It should be noted that “vendor-specific fair value” is a theoretical oxymoron under both IASB 
and FASB GAAP.  “Vendor-specific” is obviously an entity-specific concept, and it is precisely this 
element which leads to the postulated “objectivity”.  Fair value is a market-based, non-entity-specific 
concept, as (e.g.) SFAS 157 confirms.  The fact that SOP 97-2, despite its inconsistency with FASB 
definitions and standards, is being rigorously enforced, raises important issues about the real-world 
operational inter-relationships within the US GAAP hierarchy.  Since SFAS 157 explicitly excludes 
VSOE from its scope, the FASB is presumably aware of the tensions.  Para 16 of EITF 00-21 views 









































0•  the Bell-Shaped Curve Approach: the Bell-Shaped Curve Approach requires 
to analyze a software vendor’s entire population of PCS renewals, i.e. the rates 
the customers pay for PCS after the initial PCS term is over. VSOE for PCS 
exists if a clear majority of the renewal rates are within a narrow range of 
pricing. 
•  the Substantive Renewal Rate Approach: the Substantive Renewal Rate 
Approach looks at the renewal rates stated in the contract and concludes that 
VSOE exists if the contractual renewal rate is substantive.
  
Both books go further by explicitly stating that they regard these two approaches as 
the only acceptable approaches.
15 The E&Y book (page 290) additionally states a 
clear preference for one of the two approaches:  
Further, we believe that use of the Bell-Shaped Curve 
Approach is preferable to the Substantive Renewal Rate 
Approach, as it is more consistent with our understanding of 
the concepts underlying VSOE of fair value. Accordingly, we 
would not support as preferable a change from the Bell-Shaped 
Curve Approach to the Substantive Renewal Rate Approach.  
The importance of the last sentence of this quote becomes clear if one considers that 
publicly listed US companies under SEC rules are only allowed to make an 
accounting policy change if the auditor issues a statement that this change is 
preferable. 
Both books furthermore specify the key requirements of the approaches but are not 
fully consistent in this specification. E.g.:  
•  With regard to the Bell Shaped Curve Approach requirement to have the 
majority of the price points within a narrow range, the E&Y book (page 290) 
states that this criterion is met if 80% of a software vendor’s PCS renewal 
transactions fall within a range of plus or minus 15% from the midpoint of the 
range. The KPMG book (page 165) states the same 15% width of the range 
but believes that it is sufficient if the number of contracts within the range 
                                                 
15   KPMG (page 165): “We believe there are two acceptable methods for determining VSOE of 
fair value for PCS”; E&Y (page 289): “We believe that two approaches to establish VSOE of fair value 










































16 The Deloitte & Touche book states (page 24): “For 
example, if 90 percent of a vendor’s separate sales of PCS during the past 12 
months were priced between 15 percent and 17 percent of the net license fee, 
it may be appropriate to conclude that such separate sales prices constitute 
evidence of fair value”. In a statement not specific to PCS, the PWC book 
provides a different threshold: “In most instances, VSOE of fair value will be 
an average price of several recent, actual transactions that are priced within a 
reasonable range (in general, variances should typically be 10% or less).” 
•  With regard to the Substantive Renewal Rate Approach requirement that the 
renewal rate must be substantive, the E&Y book states (page 292):”We 
generally would be skeptical that a PCS renewal rate less than 10% of an intial 
software license fee is substantive.” The KPMG book does not provide such a 
threshold. 
The following example explains the impact of the audit firms’ guidance and the 
differences among them: Imagine a vendor sells to a customer software for € 1 mill. 
and one year of related PCS for € 0.14 mill. To identify the appropriate accounting the 
software vendor performs a test to determine whether VSOE of fair value exists for 
the PCS. Based on an analysis of the transactions of the previous period the vendor 
determines that 78% of the vendor’s prior period PCS renewal transactions fall within 
a range of plus or minus 15% around a median price of ‘14% of the software fee’. 
82% of the transactions fall within a range of plus or minus 17% around a median 
price and 39% of all transactions fall within a range of plus or minus 10%. 
•  If the software vendor’s auditor is Ernst & Young, the auditor would likely 
based on its audit firm guidance take the position that VSOE of fair value for 
PCS does not exist as the 80% threshold for a +/- 15% range is not met. Such 
non-existence of VSOE would under SOP 97-2 result in recognizing the entire 
€ 1.14 mill. arrangement fee ratably over the one year PCS term (assuming all 
other SOP 97-2 criteria for revenue recognition are met). 
                                                 
16   This is the wording introduced in the second edition of the KPMG book. Interestingly the first 









































0•  If the software vendor’s auditor is KPMG, the auditor would likely based on 
its audit firm guidance take the position that VSOE of fair value for PCS exists 
as the result of the test (i.e. 78%) meets the criterion of ‘approaching 80%’ for 
a +/- 17% range. Such existence of VSOE would under SOP 97-2 result in 
recognizing the € 1 mill. fee for the software license up front upon delivery of 
the software and the € 0.14 mill. PCS fee ratably over the one year PCS term. 
•  If the software vendor’s auditor is Deloitte & Touche, the auditor would likely 
based on its audit firm guidance take the position that VSOE of fair value for 
PCS does not exist as the 90% threshold for a +/- 17% range is not met. Such 
non-existence of VSOE would under SOP 97-2 result in recognizing the entire 
€ 1.14 mill. arrangement fee ratably over the one year PCS term (assuming all 
other SOP 97-2 criteria for revenue recognition are met). 
•  If the software vendor’s auditor is PWC, the auditor would likely based on its 
audit firm guidance take the position that VSOE of fair value for PCS does not 
exist as only a minority of the prior period arrangements fall within a plus or 
minus 10% range. Such non-existence of VSOE would under SOP 97-2 result 
in recognizing the entire € 1.14 mill. arrangement fee ratably over the one year 




Interestingly, an article in the CFO Magazine (Stuart, 2008) quotes a SEC staff 
members as follows:  
“We know that some of the firms quote that 80 percent within 
15 percent rule, but we try not to treat that as a bright line. The 
goal is to demonstrate consistent pricing practices”. 
 
 
                                                 
17 SAP recently acquired a new subsidiary, previously an Ernst & Young client.  The process of 
changing its accounting policies to those of the SAP group (audited by KPMG) demonstrate a 
significant correlation between company/group accounting policy, and the manual contents of the 









































03.3  The rationality of auditor GAAP 
There are a number of different types of activity which could be construed as causing 
GAAP to be created by auditors.  The simplest is probably when the auditor is asked 
to confirm the validity of a company’s proposed accounting policy, or when the 
auditor is asked to advise a single client on the appropriate treatment of a particular 
situation.  A rather more formalised situation exists when audit firms issue their own 
guidance on general or specific topics in “book” form.  Some of these are focused, 
and obviously branded, such as the revenue recognition material we discuss in section 
3.2.  However others have a more gentle association with an audit firm, and the 
branding by that firm is played down in the marketing process.  For example the book 
“Rechnungslegung nach Internationalen Standards” (Adler, Düring and Schmaltz, 
2006) providing guidance to IFRS is associated with KPMG and PWC, but is not 
marketed in this way.  “International GAAP” (Ernst & Young, 2006) is “authored” by 
Ernst and Young , but published by LexisNexis, and the Memento Pratique Francis 
Lefebvre  in France is sponsored by PWC (e.g. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004). 
 
There is a long history of professional bodies, representing auditors and accountants 
collectively, being associated with the creation or development of GAAP.  In the UK 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales issued a series of 
“recommendations” beginning in 1942, and the six UK Professional Accounting 
Bodies were closely involved with the Accounting Standards Committee (whose 
pronouncements were “intended to be mandatory” on their members (but only by the 
rules of membership, not by statute)) from 1970 to 1990.  The US standard setters 
before the FASB’s creation in 1973 were bodies within the AICPA.  In a formal 
sense, auditor influence on standard-setting has declined as standard setters have 
become more broadly based.  It is perhaps not too fanciful to suggest that auditors 
have simply carried on, now as individual firms, trying to influence and advise. 
 
A number of motivations can be suggested to explain the desire of audit firms to carry 
out these activities.  Part of the story is surely marketing and image-building.  Topics 
and foci may be chosen to increase auditor exposure in chosen industries or regions, 
rather than to maximise usefulness to the development of financial reporting.  But of 
course there are more genuine theoretical reasons.  Accounting rules affect the 









































0Messier, 1982). Auditors therefore may have a preference for clear and detailed 
reporting rules that reduce their legal exposure. From this perspective it is not good 
for “an audit firm” to be seen to apply different criteria, and approve different 
solutions, in situations of apparently similar “underlying economics”, so a mechanism 
for achieving internal consistency across an audit firm is rationalised. 
 
A further possible explanation is that client companies tend to talk between 
themselves, and if they have the same auditor such conversations often are around 
comparisons of the positions the auditor takes in the different companies. After such 
talks companies will go to the auditor and complain about the scenarios in which they 
believe they were treated worse than other clients of the same auditor. To avoid such 
games the auditor needs detailed rules to be applied consistently to all clients (Sunder, 
2002: 148).  
 
Taking a more detached view, it can be suggested that auditor GAAP creation by 
audit firms should lead to greater consistency within that audit firm (but not 
necessarily between audit firms), and that auditor GAAP creation by professional 
bodies should lead to greater consistency both within and between audit firms.  A 
further likely outcome however is a tendency to an increasingly rule-based approach, 
the more so as the auditor GAAP now comes in “underneath” the more formal 
regulations.  The examples we give above surely illustrate the development of a rule-
based approach to the level of considerable minutiae. This may best serve auditor 
needs but not necessarily be compatible with the preferences of other affected parties.  
3.4  Auditor GAAP and the US GAAP heirarchy 
The “factual” conclusions from the situations we describe in sections 3.1 and 3.2 may 
be summarised as follows: 
•  even in the rules based US GAAP system there are gaps leaving room for 
interpretations  
•  auditors seek to fill those gaps consistently across their clients by creating, and 
imposing, their own interpretations 










































The two detailed illustrations we give have some contrasting characteristics.  In 
particular, section 3.1 provides an example where the auditors have made a material, 
indeed highly significant, change in existing practice.  The situation in section 3.2 
however is more an illustration of the auditors defining existing requirements more 
precisely, i.e. determining practice, using bright lines, rather than changing it. 
 
It is worth noting that the GAAP hierarchy specified in SAS 69 (AICPA, 1992) is 
important here.  This describes four categories of accounting sources:, (a), (b), (c), 
and (d) together with other types of accounting literature below level (d).  FASB 
Concepts Statements fall in this last very low level category (a very different situation 
from that relating to International Accounting Standards, where the conceptual 
framework, whilst subsidiary to actual Standards and IASB Interpretations, assumes 
major significance in the preparation of Standards, the interpretation of Standards and 
in determining actual  practice regarding transactions for which there are no 
Standards). 
 
This GAAP hierarchy is in the process of revision, and a “near-final” new version is 
available (FASB, 2006).  This is summarised in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Although the FASB does not expect the new GAAP hierarchy to change current 
practice, three points are of real practical significance when comparing the proposed 
new GAAP hierarchy with the existing one. The first is that the GAAP hierarchy has 
been moved from the Statement on Auditing Standards No. 69 (SAS 69) (AICPA, 
1992), which was directed to the auditor, to a SFAS. The reason for doing this is that 
 
(t)he Board believes that the GAAP hierarchy should be 
directed to enterprises because it is the enterprise (not its 
auditor) that is responsible for selecting accounting principles 
for financial statements that are presented in conformity with 










































0Second, the FASB has expanded category (a) accounting principles to include all 
accounting sources that were subject to its due process. Thus, category (a) accounting 
principles are characterized by being deliberated by the Board or its designee in a 
public forum, exposed to the public for comment, and approved by the Board before 
being issued. “FASB staff positions” which were not addressed in SAS 69 have 
therefore been included in level (a) pronouncements. Third, the low and largely 
dismissive position of “FASB Concepts Statements” has not been altered, ostensibly 
as the FASB intends to address this issue in its conceptual framework project (FASB, 
2006).  
 
It is important to relate the various documents which we discuss in this section to the 
GAAP hierarchy, for two reasons.  The first is the practical consideration that if a 
higher level document tells you clearly what to do, then there is no need to investigate 
a lower level document, so knowledge of which level a document falls in is clearly 
essential. Without substantial alterations to AICPA’s SAS 69.07 as included in Audit 
Section 411, the near-final SFAS XXX.4 (FASB 2006), states.  
 
If the accounting treatment of a transaction or event is not specified by a 
pronouncement in category (a), an enterprise shall consider whether the 
accounting treatment is specified by an accounting principle from a source in 
another category. In such cases, if categories (b)-(d) contain accounting 
principles that specify accounting treatments for a transaction or event, then 
the enterprise shall follow the accounting treatment specified by the 
accounting principle from the source in the highest category—for example, 
follow category (b) treatment over category (c) (FASB, 2006:2).  
 
The second reason why determination of the relationship between the specific 
documents referred to and the GAAP hierarchy(ies) is important in that it opens up 
the research question of whether or not the promulgated hierarchy is being followed 
in practice.  We have already hinted in footnote 14 that this may not be the case, and 
further consideration follows in section 4. 
 
However, comparison of the various types of documents from section 3 to the two 
hierarchies is a rather difficult exercise, which, given its practical significance, is a 
point worth noting in itself.  Broadly, SOPs are category (b), EITFs are category (c), 









































0handbooks are explicitly included in the GAAP hierarchy below category (d). But 
since audit handbooks have in practice a strong influence on widely recognized 
accounting practice they can de facto be moved up to category (d) accounting sources. 
The suitability of accounting literature below category (d) has to be judged according 
to its relevance, the specificity of the guidance, and the authority of the issuer or 
author (FASB, 2006).  It is these low level detailed statements which seem to have 
most practical influence, even if, as we discuss in more detail below, they are 
inconsistent with higher level pronouncements.  
 
 
4) Regulatory considerations 
 
In this section we discuss a range of issues arising from the “evidence” which we 
present in section 3.  Much of the discussion is in the explicit context of US GAAP, 
but we conclude with a consideration of implications in the European and global 
context. 
 
4.1  Institutional legitimacy 
 
The first question is whether or not the examples given in section 3 are consistent 
with the three necessary and sufficient conditions for institutional legitimacy proposed 
by Johnson and Solomons.  In other words, to the extent that the propositions we 
discuss are a requirement for listed companies reporting under US GAAP, is the 
controlling body, i.e. FASB, doing its job properly?  The issue here is that the FASB, 
on the one hand, which has according to Johnson and Solomons (1984) got 
institutional legitimacy, has not specified these requirements at all.  The audit 
profession, on the other hand lacks legitimacy as a rule-making body.  
 
First, the mandate to issue accounting interpretations necessary for meeting condition 
1 (of section 2) for institutional legitimacy is questionable. The audit profession has 
not got a clear mandate to issue accounting rules. However, (audit) handbooks are 
explicitly included in the GAAP hierarchy below category (d) giving the audit 
profession some rule-making authority by the AICPA/FASB. Audit handbooks in turn 
have in practice a strong influence on widely recognized accounting practice moving 









































0profession does not have an explicit and clear mandate to issue accounting 
interpretations (neither from the FASB nor the AICPA) it has nevertheless got some 
de facto authority as a rule-making body via its promulgations included in the GAAP 
hierarchy.  
 
Second, conditions 2 and 3 relating to substantive and procedural due process are also 
both unsatisfied. The audit profession neither provides any justification when 
exercising its de facto rule-making power, nor any rationale for the rules it 
promulgates, impairing the objectivity of its decision-making process. Finally, there is 
no due process of any kind giving interested parties the opportunity to express their 
views. Incidentally, there is also absolutely no evidence that the audit firms are 
attempting their own due process by engaging in open dialogue with other parties 
such as preparers or users.  It appears that audit firms send drafts of their books to 
SEC staff to get comment and feedback, but this is not a public process providing 
affected parties an opportunity to give input into the rule-making process. It also, of 
course, lends credence to our suggestion below that the “official” regulatory process 
is using the audit profession to do its rule-making work by the back door.  We also 
cannot exclude the possibility of other private advice and discussion.  But from the 




4.2  An auditor over-ride? 
We have provided specific illustration of the specification of  a company’s detailed 
accounting policies by its auditor, when existing GAAP within the hierarchy is 
inapplicable or incomplete.  But this leads to the logically prior question: who decides 
when an existing regulation is inapplicable or incomplete?  The day-to-day practical 
answer to that question is either the preparer or the auditor (as is absolutely inevitable 
if the principle of substance over form in relation to the individual entity’s 
“underlying economics” is to be applied). In its near-final SFAS on The Hierarchy of 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles the FASB makes clear that it should be the 
enterprise (not the auditor) that is responsible for selecting accounting principles 









































0where the auditor assumes authority over the preparer and imposes its own “branded” 
policy on its clients. 
 
Putting these two points together, the auditor both a) decides whether existing GAAP 
rules apply, and b) imposes its own rules if they do not.  The auditor (with of course 
the necessity for a rational defence against ex post investigation by the SEC or 
PCAOB or some other comparable regulator) can therefore over-ride an existing 
regulation on the (subjective) grounds that it fails to show the economic substance of 
the situation.  We do not necessarily imply that this is at all a bad thing.  We do point 
out that it is against all the rhetoric of hierarchical due process, and also of “public” 
(i.e. political) control. 
 
A particularly significant point to emerge from our presentation and discussion is 
surely the effect on the practical operation of GAAP hierarchies.   We showed at the 
end of section 3 that the major regulatory parameters (rules?) relevant to deciding 
what a company has to do are low down the US GAAP hierarchy.  Section 3 as a 
whole shows that as far as a particular company is concerned what it has to do is 
determined by sub rules, interpreting the GAAP rules, which may be imposed by its 
auditor (without due process and a clear mandate, see 4.1 above).  Footnote 14 
illustrates that the process gives priority to very detailed lower level GAAP rules, 
whether promulgated or not, even if a higher level regulation, e.g. full-blown Standard 
as in footnote 14, is being ignored in both spirit and letter.  The official US GAAP 
hierarchy is being reversed in its practical application.  Stronger points can be made, 
however.  We have argued in footnote 14 that the rules regarding “vendor-specific fair 
value” from a SOP (category (b)) are explicitly inconsistent with SFAS 157 
definitions (category (a)), and it is the SOP on which the audit firms base their 
detailed rules (which latter are either category (d) or even below).  It is these detailed 
rules (category (d) or below) which determine the practical outcomes, and the 
numbers in the financial statements.  Even more fundamentally
18, following from 
section 302 of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Pub. L. No.107-204; 2002) and the SEC’s 
rules (Release No. 33-8124, Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and 
                                                 
18 We are grateful to Lawrence Cunningham for comments on an earlier draft which have significantly 
clarified our ideas in this section.  The attitudes and arguments expressed are the sole and complete 









































0Annual Reports, 29 August 2002), CEOs and CFOs are required to certify that the 
company’s financial statements present fairly the financial condition and results of 
operations of the company.  In the explanatory (narrative) portion of its release, the 
SEC refers to the need to reflect the “underlying transactions and events” (emphasis 
added).
19  Since the required treatment of ARSs and VRDNs which we demonstrate in 
section 3 absolutely clearly fails to do this, it is not only incompatible with higher 
level items in the GAAP hierarchy, one may argue that it is simply illegal under US 
law!  But it is still being vigorously enforced.  We conclude that auditor GAAP is 
shown to be a significant part of a practical reversal of the official US GAAP 
hierarchy.  The de facto position is opposite to the de jure.
 
 
But we do not believe that this is the end of the story.  The required certification 
described above makes no mention of GAAP.  The certifying officer is required to 
certify (S.240.13(a) – 14(b)(3)) that  
Based on his or her knowledge, the financial statements, and 
other financial information included in the report, fairly present 
in all material respects the financial condition, results of 
operations and cash flows of the issuer as of, and for, the 
periods presented in the report.   
 
Certification of, or comment on a failure to provide, consistency with GAAP is not 
required.  This wording, closely following the phraseology in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
itself, surely represents a deliberate attempt by Congress to reduce the significance of 
GAAP, viewed as a set of rules, and to increase the significance of “presents fairly”.  
The traditional wording of a U.S. audit opinion (“presents fairly in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles”) has been carefully avoided. 
 
This change may perhaps be viewed as no more than a belated recognition of the true 
legal position as determined by U.S. Courts.  The leading case is the so-called 
Continental Vending case (United States v Simon, 1970).  This case was held before a 
jury, and may be taken as legal precedent that twelve ordinary intelligent U.S. 
citizens, after hearing weeks of close legal and accounting argument about rules, 
                                                 
19 This is consistent with Levitt (2003): “(n)ew rules should ensure that the underlying economics of 









































0practices and GAAP, may have the simple common sense to get back to the key 
question (were the financial statements misleading?) and find accordingly.   
 
The issue for the Court of Appeals in Simon was the correctness of the trial judge’s 
instruction to the jury.  The defendants wanted the instruction to say (in effect) “(1) 
we can be guilty only if, under GAAP, the financials did not fairly present etc and (2) 
then only if departures from GAAP were made wilfully and with intent to deceive”.  
The trial judge refused to give these instructions, telling the jury instead that the issue 
was whether the financials were fairly presented.  The jury having found that the 
financials were not fairly presented, the Court of Appeals only had before it the issue 
of whether the instruction was correct (and it held that it was correct).  The Court of 
Appeal (composed of course of lawyers) seemed surprised itself, concluding its 
refusal to overturn the guilty verdict as follows: 
 
Finding that the evidence was sufficient for submission to the 
jury and that no legal errors were committed, we must let the 
verdict stand. 
 
Perhaps only another jury can stop the FASB from supporting the prevalence of 
detailed lower-order rules over higher-level principles of economic substance!   
 
To put the point more clearly, suppose that a set of financial statements follow 
“auditor GAAP”, as the term is used in our paper, or, for that matter, “preparer 
GAAP”, and that the GAAP used is inconsistent with the GAAP hierarchy as 
pronounced.  If the relevant directors are accused of failing to prepare ‘proper’ 
financial statements, how will a court react?  If the court follows the Continental 
Vending case, which we submit stands as a relevant case precedent, then it will likely 
decide the issue purely on the question of whether or not the financial statements 
presented fairly.  If this analysis is correct, then the source of the detailed rules, and 
the actual content of the detailed rules, turn out to be irrelevant, except to the extent 
that a jury chooses to allow its interpretation of “fair presentation” to be influenced 
thereby. 
 
Such a conclusion is seen to be consistent both with the decision in Continental 









































0of substance over form, and common sense, over the legalistic absurdities of the 
FASB and SEC, whether or not those absurdities were aided and abetted by “auditor 
GAAP”.  We suggest however that, in our view unfortunately, preparers are unlikely 
to mount a legal challenge to the FASB/SEC/Auditor bureaucratic conspiracy, in 
which situation users will continue to receive useless, or even misleading, information 
(as illustrated in sections 3.1 and 3.2). 
 
Some of the arguments in this section have already been pointed out by Ijiri (2005).  
He has noticed (p267) both the absence of any mention of GAAP in the Sarbanes-
Oxley certification requirements, and the likely relevance of the Continental Vending 
case.  But the conclusions that he draws are different.  In the explicit context of 
Continental Vending, he states as follows. 
 
Up to that time, it was considered to be sufficient to follow 
GAAP fairness which is based on the profession’s standards.  
Now, that is not enough, and certification by CEO/CFO should 
be based on pure fairness (emphasis added). 
 
Ijiri’s preference for what he explicitly accepts is a lower level of requirement is 
clearly stated in his Abstract (p255). 
 
The article concludes with the strong need to focus on 
“procedural fairness” in establishing accounting standards as 
well as in implementing the reform legislation and 
administration, in contrast to “pure fairness” that is almost 
impossible to achieve by anyone. 
 
Our preference is different, as we prefer partial success in achieving the useful, rather 
than total success in achieving the useless. 
 
4.3  Implications for the IASB and the global harmonisation process 
We have provided evidence in section 3, within the US context, that in practice 
rules may extend to the level of minutiae, and may be auditor-imposed, outside 
any mandate and claimed due process.  We see no logical reason why this 
phenomenon should be restricted to the US.  IAS 8.12., similarly to the US GAAP 
hierarchy, also requires enterprises to look at “other accounting literature” and 









































0for a transaction that is not specifically dealt with in a Standard or an 
Interpretation. Therefore, if the Schipper (2005: 122) prediction given in section 2 
turns out to have validity (and noting firstly that the more principles-focussed 
IFRSs leave more scope for possible later rules creation than US GAAP does, and 
secondly that the audit firms enforcing their own interpretations of IFRSs are 
likely to be the same organisation, with the same in-house technical department, 
as is now creating the rules in the US context), then a widespread application of 
the phenomenon seems extremely likely.  
 
KPMG’s “practical guide to IFRSs” (KPMG, 2006: 684/5) addresses software 
revenue recognition, using an example, as follows. 
 
IFRSs do not provide specific guidance on revenue recognition 
for software-related transactions.  Often, software sales 
arrangements provide for sale of the software, together with 
subsequent servicing or licence arrangements.  The substance 
of the transaction should be considered to determine whether 
the various components are linked and therefore accounted for 
as a single contract.  The general revenue recognition rules are 
applied to each component.   
 
For example, K develops anti-virus software and sells non-
renewable licences for the use of the software.  The licencee 
receives the following during the licence period (which 
generally is two years): 
•  use of the software over the period of the licence; 
•  technical support in case of problems in installing and 
running the software; and 
•  an unlimited quantity of updates of the virus database, 
but not to the software itself. 
The various elements of the product (as above) are not sold 
separately.  Once the licence period ends, users who want to 
continue using the software are required to pay the full fee 
again. 
 
In our view, the components of the licence fee are not 
separately identifiable because no identifiable selling price 
exists for each of the components and each component of the 
product is considered to be directly interrelated to the others.  
The software on its own would be useless without the regular 
virus upgrades.  We believe that the whole fee should be 
recognised as revenue over the licence period on a straight-line 










































0In our view, the stage of completion method is not always 
appropriate for the recognition of revenue for software licences 
and sales if the sale cannot be separated from any installation or 
services sold.  In many cases the costs to complete the 
transaction and the direct costs incurred can be measured 
reliably.  However, one of the costs incurred by the entity is 
that related to the cost of initial development of the software 
package.  This cost would be related to all software and 
licences sold by the entity and not only to a single package sold 
to a single customer.  (emphases added) 
 
Note in particular the double use of the words “in our view”.  Auditor determination 
of micro-rules does indeed seem set to spread and continue in the IASB context 
implying the same concerns as those raised for the US context. Even though IAS 1.13 
demands financial statements to provide a fair presentation and even requires 
management to depart from a requirement in an IFRS it would result in misleading 
financial statements (if this is not in contradiction with the relevant regulatory 
framework) the apprehension remains that preparers will usually follow the detailed 
rules provided by auditors. However, in an international context with differing 
economic, political, cultural and legal environments the idea that detailed regulations 
will help to achieve the overall objective of a fair presentation of financial statements 







                                                 
20 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) contains a foreword by Sir David Tweedie (page P007) which ends 
with the sentence “I recommend this Manual of Accounting, which gives preparers and practitioners 
the benefits of the extensive experience and professional judgement of PricewaterhouseCoopers”.  
Whilst this statement is clearly an endorsement of the concept of auditor manuals, and “professional 
judgement” could be seen as a synonym for “auditor GAAP”, it still gives explicit emphasis to 










































5)  Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
 
The genus of this paper was the availability of the extremely detailed evidence of 
micro rule making by auditors which we present in section 3.  The general context is 




1.  What is the appropriate balance of preparer and auditor involvement in the 
selection of detailed accounting policies?  How acceptable is the situation we 
describe in section 3 and discuss in section 4? 
 
2.  We have provided evidence strengthening the proposition by Baker and Hayes 
(2004: 783) that the FASB is, directly or indirectly, actively supporting the 
superiority of form over substance in opposition to both public rhetoric and 
explicitly-stated regulatory philosophy.  Is this to be tolerated? 
 
 
The results of the recent moves in relation to cash equivalents under FAS 95 
represent a triumph of form-based rules as against principle-based substance, and 
completely fail to give a fair presentation of the economics of the situation as they 
would be perceived from an investor perspective.  We submit that answers to our 
questions above which would fail to rectify this situation are automatically 
inadequate. 
 
The implications of the software revenue recognition problem seem less clear.  
The illustration given in section 3.2 surely demonstrates an absurd position in that 
the different and arbitrary numerical “bright lines” produce major differences of 
presentation of situations which have no major differences economically.  But two 
ways can be suggested for avoiding this, from opposite philosophical perspectives.  
These are a) abolish “bright lines” altogether and stick to principles (as the KPMG 
IFRS Guide we quote in section 4.3  seems to do), or b) impose a single arbitrary 









































0together and otherwise, have discussed at length elsewhere (e.g. reference 
suppressed, 2007, with further references).  But this juxtaposition only emphasises 
the importance of achieving broad agreement on the general issues underlying our 
questions above. 
 
Several suggestions arise for possible further research.  One question would be the 
precise motivation for the regulatory developments.  Why, for example, did PWC 
issue their 2005 statement in the first place (and why in 2005?)?  A different type 
of development would be to explore whether regulatory changes had any effect on 
client company actions.  For example do companies generally change their liquid 
asset/short term investment operations as a result of the changes in reporting 
treatment?
21  Thirdly, and importantly, consideration of the implications of the 
auditor attitudes and actions discussed in this paper for other standards/regulatory 
systems (especially, but not only, IFRS), is called for. Finally whether there is a 
correlation between the auditors’ tendency to issue auditor GAAP and the 
regulatory environment, particularly the auditor liability, would be worth 
exploring. 
 
Lastly, what of the auditor as regulator?  The involvement of the auditor in the 
interpretation and application of regulations prepared by others is inevitable.  In a 
sense, that is their very reason for existence.  But the illustrations given here 
suggest that auditors may use this position to impose precise, arguably misleading, 
and, we have argued, logically illegal, requirements on preparers that may best 
serve auditors needs but not those of other affected parties.  The effect is to deny 
preparers, who alone have the legal duty to present proper financial statements, 
the right to consider “interpretation and application of regulations” for themselves. 
The responsibility of the management for selecting appropriate accounting 
principles is also stressed by the FASB in its reasoning for moving the GAAP 
hierarchy from the auditing literature to a SFAS.   
 
The absence of a due process may lead to biased rules and it is no longer ensured 
that adequate consideration is given to the various views of the affected parties. 
                                                 
21   SAP’s 2007 financial statements show that SAP has sold all its investments in ARS and 









































0Instead, accounting rules may be geared to best serve auditors’ needs. Our 
concerns are that such “auditor GAAP” may stultify intelligent practice, and 
negate the possibility of giving a fair presentation of the underlying economic 
reality of particular transactions and events.  The fact that, in the US, the FASB 
seems to be aiding and abetting such stultification and negation, by allowing or 
endorsing form over substance (in a way which perhaps allows preparers to blame 
auditors rather than the FASB itself) only makes our concerns all the greater.  It 
seems that only an over-riding emphasis on the fair presentation requirement, 
undefined as it is, can rectify this situation.  It also seems that such an emphasis, 
in the ultimate situation of a court case, is likely to exist. 
 
Finally, we must point out that the situation we describe and demonstrate is set to 
be even more counter-productive if transferred to International Accounting 
Standards whether in a US context or globally.
22  The greater emphasis under 
IFRS on economic substance, on judgement, and on the general importance of the 
conceptual framework (unlike in the US GAAP hierarchy) renders the attitudes 
and actions we demonstrate here as absolutely unacceptable. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Ernst & Young (2007b), in a report on the SEC roundtables of December 13 and 17, 2007, state that 
(p4) 
panellists indicated that in order for [IFRS] to be successfully implemented 
in the US, the US regulatory and legal environments would need to better 














































 Category (a) 
•  AICPA Accounting Research Bulletins (ARB)  
•  Accounting Principles Board Opinions (APB) 
•  FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) 
•  FASB Interpretations (FIN) 
•  FASB Statement 133 Implementation Issues 
•  FASB Staff Positions 
•  For SEC registrants only: Rules and interpretive releases of the SEC 
 
 Category (b) 
•  FASB Technical Bulletins (FTB) 
•  AICPA Industry Audit and Accounting Guides, if cleared by the 
FASB 
•  AICPA Statements of Position (SOP), if cleared by the FASB 
 
 Category (c) 
•  AICPA AcSEC Practice Bulletins (PB) that have been cleared by the 
FASB 
•  Consensus Positions of the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) 
•  Topics discussed in Appendix D of EITF-Abstracts (EITF D Topics)  
 
 Category (d) 
•  Implementation guides (Q&As) published by the FASB staff 
•  AICPA Accounting Interpretations (AIN) 
•  AICPA Industry Audit and Accounting Guides and Statements of 
Positions not cleared by the FASB 
•  Practices that are widely recognized and prevalent either generally or 
in the industry 
 
Other Accounting Literature 
•  FASB Concepts Statements (CON) 
•  AICPA Issues Papers 
•  IFRS 
•  Pronouncements of other professional associations or regulatory 
agencies 
•  Technical Information Service Inquiries and Replies included in 
AICPA Technical Practice Aids 
•  Accounting textbooks, handbooks and articles  
 
Source: FASB (2006), “Near-Final” Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 1XX: The Hierarchy of Generally Accepted Accounting 
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